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ABSTRACT 
 
The simmering dispute between the European Union and United States over 
trade in agricultural biotechnology is worthy of study for several reasons.  First, 
it is a potentially significant source of tension in one of the world￿s most 
economically and politically important trade relations.  Second, it hinges on 
different approaches to regulating risk, and thus is particularly difficult type of 
trade dispute to resolve.  Third, the dispute appears to be affecting regulatory 
policy on both sides of the Atlantic.  
 
This paper focuses on this reappraisal of domestic political decision in the 
light of international pressure. I argue that while one would not expect the 
United States government to ￿trade up￿ ￿ strengthen its domestic regulations ￿ 
and would expect it to ￿trade blows￿ ￿ prosecute the European Union￿s rules 
through the multilateral trading system ￿ we observe the opposites.  In 
particular, trading up is taking place in response to the learning by and 
mobilization of US consumers and to business adaptation to the EU￿s rules and 
changing domestic market conditions.  There are limits to this process, however, 
and limited ￿trading up￿ by the US (even combined with reform in the EU) is 
insufficient to end the dispute.  There are also political and legal limits to 
￿trading blows,￿ which mean that further, externally driven reform of the EU￿s 
procedures is highly unlikely.  Consequently, barring any biotechnology 
disasters and pending any breakthroughs with direct and evident benefits to 
consumers that would shift the balance decisively in either direction, the likely 
scenario is one of protracted tension.  The two sides will therefore likely seek to 
minimize (at the margins) the disruptive effects of continuing regulatory 
differences.  
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I. Introduction
1 
“Sound Science, Not Political Science” 
− National Food Processors Association, Annual 
Report, 1999-2000, p. 21 
 
I cannot pretend to be able to address the hard science aspects of agricultural 
biotechnology.  In contrast to the National Food Processors Association, 
however, I think that while politics are very much in evidence in the 
transatlantic dispute concerning agricultural biotechnology, political science has 
largely been absent.  This paper seeks to illuminate the dispute by bringing a 
political science perspective to bear and by situating it in the broader context of 
the political interaction between international trade and domestic regulation. 
  
The simmering dispute between the European Union and United States 
over agricultural biotechnology is worthy of study for several reasons.  First, it 
is a potentially significant source of tension in one of the world￿s most 
economically and politically important trade relations, and it is one with 
ramifications for the rest of the world as well.  Second, the dispute hinges on 
different approaches to a new technology and the risks associated with it.  As 
such, it represents a particularly difficult type of trade dispute to resolve and one 
that arguably is becoming increasingly salient in international trade.  Third, 
there are indications that the dispute is affecting regulatory policy on both sides 
of the Atlantic.  Thus, international pressures are prompting a reappraisal of 
domestic political decisions.  This last aspect is the main focus of this paper.   
  
I argue that while one would not expect the United States government to 
￿trade up￿ ￿ strengthen its domestic regulations ￿ and would expect it to ￿trade 
blows￿ ￿ prosecute the European Union￿s rules through the multilateral trading 
system ￿ we observe the opposites.  In particular, ￿trading up￿ is taking place in 
response to the learning by and mobilisation of US consumers and to business 
adaptation to the EU￿s rules and changing domestic market conditions.  There 
are limits to this process, however, and limited ￿trading up￿ by the US (even 
combined with reform in the EU) is insufficient to end the dispute.  There are 
also political and legal limits to ￿trading blows,￿ which mean that further, 
externally driven reform of the EU￿s procedures is highly unlikely.   
Consequently, barring any biotechnology disasters and pending any 
                                                           
1 This highly derivative subtitle combines David Vogel￿s Trading Up: Consumer and 
Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy and Stephen Woolcock￿s Market Access 
Issues in EC-US Relations: Trading Partners or Trading Blows?.  Early versions of this paper 
was presented to the Robert Schuman Centre￿s Transatlantic Seminar on 7 March 2001 and 
the University of Glasgow￿s Department of Politics on 9 May 2001.  I am grateful to the 
participants for their comments.  I am particularly grateful to Mark Pollack for his comments 
on an earlier version of this paper.  I am also indebted to the practitioners who discussed these 
issues with me.     
RSC 2001/30 ' 2001 Alasdair R. Young  4
breakthroughs with direct and evident benefits to consumers that would shift the 
balance decisively in either direction, the likely scenario is one of protracted 
tension.  The two sides will therefore likely seek to minimize (at the margins) 
the disruptive effects of continuing regulatory differences. 
 
I begin by discussing the interaction of international trade and domestic 
(regulatory) politics (Section II).  I then describe the US approval process for 
genetically modified (GM)
2 crops and contrast it with the EU￿s (Section III).  
This discussion sets up an analysis of the contours of the dispute, which 
summarizes the main differences in the two approaches and spells out their 
impact on trade (Section IV).  In Section V I reverse the focus and describe how 
US regulatory policy is changing and in Section VI analyze the impact the 
dispute has had on that change.  In the next section (VII) I pull back from the 
focus on the domestic level to examine EU-US cooperation in bilateral and 
multilateral fora.  In the final section (VIII) I draw out some of the implications 
of my analysis both for how the dispute might develop and for our 
understanding the dynamic interaction between international pressures and 
domestic politics. 
 
II. International Trade and Domestic Regulatory Politics 
 
The interaction between international trade and domestic politics hinges on the 
obstacles to trade posed by differences between national regulations. Because all 
products sold in a country must comply with its domestic regulations, any 
products not complying with those rules are excluded. Such technical barriers to 
trade (TBTs) have become increasingly significant as domestic regulation has 
expanded and as other trade barriers, notably tariffs, have fallen (Hocking, 1999; 
Vogel, 1995). 
 
How significant the export market is (economically and as a policy 
exemplar) relate to the aggrieved country￿s ￿sensitivity￿ interdependence − how 
much changes abroad inflict cost/change at home (Keohane and Nye, 1989).  
The greater a country￿s ￿sensitivity￿ interdependence the stronger will be 
domestic political mobilization.  To the extent that Country B￿s firms can adapt 
to Country A￿ rules, that mobilization will be damped.  The harder it is for 
Country B￿s producers or government to respond effectively to the challenge 
posed by Country A￿s rules, however, the greater Country B￿s ￿vulnerability￿ 
interdependence and the greater its incentive to reach a cooperative solution to 
                                                           
2 A wide variety of adjectives ￿ including transgenic, genetically engineered and 
bioengineered ￿ is used to describe to organisms that have had genes inserted from another 
organism using recombinant DNA technology.  Although genetic modification can occur 
through selective breading, I use the term here as it is commonly applied to refer to the new 
technology of agricultural biotechnology.     
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its problem.  Asymmetries in interdependence, however, structure the power 
relationship between partners, and the country that has higher levels of 
sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence will be in a weaker negotiating 
position.  Any compromise would therefore favor the other partner. 
 
When domestic producers￿ access to another country￿s market is restricted 
by TBTs, a government, therefore, has essentially four possible political 
responses: 1) trying to force the other government to change its rules to 
eliminate the barrier (￿trading blows￿); 2) changing its own rules to match those 
of the importing country (￿trading up￿); 3) seeking a cooperative solution; and 4) 
doing nothing.  The first three policy options are not mutually exclusive.   
Further, the attractiveness (or unattractiveness) of one option may affect the 
attractiveness (or unattractiveness) of the others.  As my focus is the impact of 
international trade on domestic politics, I focus on the second option ￿ the 
adoption of stricter domestic rules,
 3   what David Vogel (1995) has called 
￿trading up.￿  The other options, however, are necessarily part of the story. 
 
According to Vogel (1995: 8), ￿trading up￿ is most likely to occur when: 
1) the countries in question are parties to an international agreement aimed at 
eliminating technical barriers to trade and 2) when the most economically 
important participating country has strict consumer and environmental 
protection standards.  Thus trade among the member governments of the 
European Union is most likely to lead to ￿trading up,￿ and a number of studies 
have found evidence of such a dynamic (Peterson, 1997; Sbragia, 1993; Scharpf, 
1996; Vogel, 1993, 1995; Young and Wallace, 2000). 
 
The simmering transatlantic dispute over genetically modified food, 
however, presents a ￿hard case￿ for ￿trading up.￿  First, the 1995 New 
Transatlantic Agenda and, more specifically, the 1998 Transatlantic Economic 
Partnership, which structure the bilateral EU-US relationship, do not provide a 
strong impetus for eliminating regulatory barriers, although they do provide a 
framework for diffusing disputes (Egan, 2001; Peterson, 2001).  In addition, the 
multilateral trading system that frames the transatlantic relationship is better 
suited to eliminating national rules that obstruct trade than to promulgating 
common approaches.   
 
Second, although the EU is generally a large market, in 1999 it was only 
the third largest US agricultural export market (after Japan and Canada) 
accounting for 14 percent of exports (USDA, 2000a).  Further, even though the 
US is a major agricultural exporter, domestic consumption is much more 
                                                           
3 I use stricter standard although ￿more risk averse,￿ a formulation suggested by David Vogel 
in a talk to the Robert Schuman Centre on 12 December 2000, might be more accurate (if 
more cumbersome) as it avoids the connotation that stricter standards are objectively better.     
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important than exports.  In volume terms, the US exports 25 percent of its grain 
production
4 and 29 percent of its soybean production (USDA, 2000b).
5   
 
Two additional (and related) reasons why the agricultural biotechnology 
is a ￿hard case￿ for trading up are linked to the fact that genetically modified 
foods are subject to an approval process rather than having to comply with a 
particular standard.  First, as imported products will still require the approval of 
the importer, domestic regulatory reform is not sufficient to secure access to the 
foreign market.  This means that there is little incentive for domestic producers 
to advocate policy change, which neutralizes one of the key mechanisms of 
￿trading up￿; the formation of ￿Baptist and bootlegger￿ coalitions between firms 
seeking competitive advantage through stricter regulations and civic interests
6 
pursing higher levels of protection (Vogel, 1995).  
 
Second, domestic policy change is likely to be very difficult because 
instead of trying to change a specific standard (the outcome of the regulatory 
process), as is usually the case, one is seeking to change the process itself.  In 
other words, one needs to change domestic institutions, not just outcomes.   
Institutions are resistant to change because the political hurdles to reforming 
them are high (Hall, 1986; Krasner, 1982; North, 1990; Thelen and Stienmo, 
1992).  As will become clear in the following section, the institutions involved 
are rooted in deep-seated features of the respective regulatory systems, such as 
the role of science, attitudes to risk and the political independence of regulatory 
agencies.  To the extent that there is change, therefore, it is unlikely to be radical 
and it is most likely to occur if it is along the same ￿trajectory￿ as the existing 
institutions. 
 
Despite these reasons not to expect it, at least limited ￿trading up￿ has 
occurred in the United States, as Section V demonstrates.  The following 
sections contrast the two approval processes, mapping the point of departure for 
US reform, and examine the economic implications of the differences between 
them. 
 
                                                           
4 Wheat, rice, corn, oats, barley, sorghum grain, and feedstuffs. 
5 Together these account for 80 percent of US bulk commodity exports (USDA, 2000a). 
6 Helen Wallace and I introduced the term ￿civic interests￿ to embrace ￿those interests other 
than those of producers that are relevant to both individual items of market regulation and the 
broad policy impact.￿  The term captures the notion that there are distinct interests that most 
members of a polity all else being equal would prefer but that societal preferences often differ 
as to what price is warranted to realize those interests (Young and Wallace, 2000: 2, 11).     
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III. Approving Biotechnology Products: Why? Versus Why Not? 
 
In order to set the scene for both the trade dispute and the policy changes 
underway in the US, it is necessary to survey the origins and characteristics of 
both regulatory systems.  I begin with a discussion of the US regulatory regime 
prior to the reforms initiated in May 2000.  I shall return to these reforms in 
Section V when I examine in detail the impact of the trade dispute on US 
domestic regulatory politics.  My discussion of the EU￿s regime will focus on 
the system in place, but will include a summary of new procedure adopted in 
March 2001.  In the following section I will identify the principal differences, 
both in terms of procedures and outcomes, between two regulatory regimes and 
draw out the implications for trade in agricultural products.  
 
  Three issues are the focus of regulation of agricultural biotechnology: 
 
1. Whether and under what conditions may a genetically modified crop be 
grown (environmental protection); 
2.  Whether food produced from genetically modified crops is safe for human 
(or animal) consumption (consumer protection); 
3. What information should consumers be given about a genetically 
modified food (consumers￿ right to know). 
 
Although the US and EU regulatory systems address these same issues, they do 
so very differently. This UK￿s House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities pithily characterized the difference as ￿Why not?￿ 
versus ￿Why?￿ (House of Lords, 1998: para 44). 
 
The United States: Why not? 
 
The US framework for regulating biotechnology, the Coordinated Framework 
for the Regulation of Biotechnology, was established in 1986 the White House￿s 
Office of Science and Technology at the height of deregulation in the United 
States (Shapiro, 2000; Vogel, 2000).  The centerpiece of this framework was the 
￿substantial equivalence￿ of products developed using biotechnology and those 
produced using traditional means; genetically modified foods are not considered 
inherently different from other foods.  This implied that  no special regulatory 
mechanisms were needed, and responsibility for overseeing agricultural 
biotechnology was apportioned among the agencies already responsible for food 
safety: the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  
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Before addressing the specifics of the regulation of biotechnology in the 
US it is, therefore, necessary to sketch some key features of broader food-safety 
framework.  US regulatory agencies must follow procedural requirements laid 
down by Congress.  In particular, the Administrative Procedure Act specifies 
that final regulations must be justified by policy rationale, scientific bases and 
legal authority (US, 2000).  In addition, US regulatory decisions are subject to 
legal review and often end in litigation (Jasanoff, 1987).  These two features 
combine to lead agencies to base decisions closely on scientific evidence so that 
they can withstand legal challenge and judicial scrutiny (Andersen, 1999; Vogel, 
2000).
  This approach has been labeled ￿sound science￿ by its proponents (e.g., 
Andersen, 1999; White House, 2000).  Industry￿s legal responsibility to produce 
safe food and the attendant producer liability are also crucial elements of the US 
food safety system (US, 2000: 282).   
 
The USDA is responsible, under the Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA) for 
protecting plants and for safeguarding US agriculture.  As such, it is the lead 
agency for the oversight of environmental release of genetically modified plants 
and animals (McCammon, 1999).  If, however, the crop is going to be planted 
on more than 10 acres the EPA must also give its approval.  Following field 
trials a company can apply to the USDA for non-regulated status, which means 
that the crop can be grown without site-specific permits.  Such approval is thus 
effectively necessary for commercial production.  
 
Field tests of GM crops began in the US in 1988, and the first GM crop 
was commercially planted in 1995. As of early 2001 the USDA had approved 54 
of 76 petitions submitted for non-regulated status,
7 and nearly 75 million acres 
of GM crops were growing in the US (out of 109.2 million acres worldwide) 
(James, 2001). In 1999 GM varieties accounted for half of all soybean acreage 
in the US, 55 percent of cotton acreage and 33 percent of corn acreage (James, 
2000).  Although overall acreage of GM crops grown in the US increased in 
2000, with a particularly large increase in GM cotton, the area of GM corn in the 
US decreased (James, 2001). 
 
The EPA￿s responsibility for GM crops is related to its responsibility for 
regulating pesticide residues in food under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide 
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(FFDCA) and microorganism products under the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA) and to its oversight of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  
It sets acceptable limits for pesticide residues in food and is responsible for 
assessing whether plants genetically modified to be pest resistant exceed these 
                                                           
7 Current Status of Petitions, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotech/petday.html, visited 8 
February 2001.     
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limits.  It also assesses the impact of exposure and toxicity of the plant-pesticide 
to non-target organisms, such as wildlife and beneficial insects. 
 
As of early 2001 the EPA had registered 21 plant-incorporated 
protectants
8 (ten of which are products for a Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) 
protein/gene complex).
9 The Bt registrations initially are for a limited time.
10   
 
The FDA has primary responsibility for regulating foods derived from 
GM crops. According to the FDA￿s 1992 policy, foods developed through 
genetic modification are not inherently dangerous and, except in rare cases, 
should not require extraordinary premarket testing or regulation.  In essence, 
genetically modified foods should be regulated as ordinary foods unless they 
contain substances or demonstrate attributes that are not usual for the product 
(Levitt, 2000a).  Premarket approval is required only if there is scientific 
uncertainty about safety, that is if the substances intentionally introduced by 
genetic engineering are not functionally very similar to others commonly and 
safely consumed, and thus generally recognized as safe (GRAS) (Maryanski, 
1999). Until 2001 even prior notification was voluntary, but was sought in 
practice (Maryanski, 1999).  Labeling is required only if the composition of the 
genetically modified product differs significantly from what is expected (e.g., in 
nutritional value) or if it contains potential allergens (Levitt, 2000a; Maryanski, 
1999). 
 
The first commercialized GM food product, fermentation-produced 
chymosin (FPC), which is used in making cheese, was approved by the FDA in 
1990.  By November 2000 the FDA had approved 48 foods derived from new 
plant varieties derived through genetic modification.
11   
 
The European Union: Why?  
 
EU rules on biotechnology were developed as part of the project to create the 
single European market.  The objective is thus to have a common approval for 
all biotechnology products grown or sold in the EU￿s 15 member states.   
Crucially, however, the member governments do not fully trust each other or the 
                                                           
8 Previously called ￿plant-pesticides￿ but Congress thought that the term would put consumers 
off. 
9 ￿EPA Plant Pesticide Regulatory Decisions￿ at 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotech/EPA/index.html accessed on 8 February 2001. 
10 The registrations for Bt corn and cotton were due to expire in April and January 2001, 
respectively, but have been extended until September 2001, while the agency revises its 
approval procedures. 
11 ￿Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties Derived through Recombinant DNA 
Technology: Final Consultations under FDA￿s 1992 Policy,￿ November 2000, 
http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/biocon.html     
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European Commission to regulate such products properly.
 12 As a result, any 
member government can impede the approval of any product. In addition, the 
EU￿s rules on biotechnology include safeguard clauses, which permit member 
governments under certain circumstances to exclude from their territories 
biotechnology products that have been approved for sale in the EU.
13   
 
  The EU￿s approach to agricultural biotechnology and particularly how the 
rules are implemented also reflect a more general (and relatively recent) 
emphasis on the ￿precautionary principle￿ as an important tool of risk 
management (Vogel, 2001).  The precautionary principle emphasizes a cautious 
approach when existing scientific understanding is incomplete or when there is 
not a consensus about the nature of a threat (PIU, 2000).  The increased 
emphasis on a ￿precautionary￿ approach to agricultural biotechnology has its 
roots in a number of recent regulatory failures concerning consumer safety in 
Europe: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or ￿mad cow￿ disease) in the 
UK and now elsewhere; HIV-tainted blood in France; and dioxin-contaminated 
food in Belgium (Pollack and Shaffer, 2001; Vogel, 2001). 
 
  The EU￿s approach differs in four fundamental and crucial differences 
from the US system.  First, in effect biotechnology products are considered 
inherently different from those produced via other means; ￿substantial 
equivalence￿ is rejected.
14  Second, the European approval process provides 
much greater scope for the consideration of non-scientific factors.  Third, 
consumers￿ right to know is given greater weight.  Fourth, there are many more 
veto points in the approval process. 
 
  The approval of agricultural biotechnology in the EU is governed by: 
Directive 90/220/EEC on the deliberate release into the environment of 
genetically modified organisms (field trials; commercial crops; foods containing 
genetically modified organisms; e.g., tomato); and Regulation 258/97 on novel 
                                                           
12 The Commission (1998: 3) has noted that assessments by one member government are 
￿usually￿ not accepted by other member governments. For a discussion of how the lack of 
trust affects the single market, see Previdi, 1997. 
13 Such safeguard clauses are not uncommon in EU law.  Most prominently, Article 95(5) of 
the Treaty of Rome provides the right of member governments to exclude products so long as 
it has scientific reasons for doing so. 
14 This was a source of contention within the Commission when Directive 90/220 was being 
developed.  The Directorates General responsible for agriculture, industry and research 
favored regulation based on safety, quality and efficacy.  The Directorate General responsible 
for the environment, however, favored regulation based on the process by which the product 
is produced (Patterson, 2000).     
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foods (foods derived from biotechnology, e.g. tomato paste or ketchup).
 15   
These correspond roughly to the two main regulatory concerns about 
agricultural biotechnology identified earlier: its environmental impact and its 




The deliberate release directive was adopted in 1990 (a replacement directive 
was adopted in March 2001) and has been the principal focus of the transatlantic 
trade dispute.  It requires that a manufacturer or importer of a genetically 
modified product seek the prior approval of the government of the member state 
in which the product is first going to be grown or sold.  If that government 
evaluates the submitted information favorably, the dossier is forwarded to the 
Commission and to the other member governments for consideration. If none of 
the other member governments raise an objection, the product may then 
circulate freely throughout the EU. Only three varieties of GM carnations have 
been approved by this procedure. 
 
  If, as has been much more common, any member government raises an 
objection, a decision has to be taken at the EU level through a centralized 
procedure.  The Commission, in the light of scientific advice, makes a proposal 
to a Regulatory Committee (composed of representatives of the member 
governments).  If the Committee does not give a favorable opinion (by qualified 
majority vote), the proposal is forwarded to the Council, which can adopt the 
Commission￿s proposal by qualified majority.  It can reject the Commission￿s 
proposal only by a unanimous vote.  If the Council does not take a decision 
within three months, the Commission decides.  Thus the Commission is obliged 
to authorize a genetically modified organism, if the application complies with 
EU rules and is not unanimously rejected by the Council within the fixed 
deadline.  This is what happened in 1997 when the Commission approved a 
variety of Bt corn developed by Ciba-Giegy (now Syngenta) (Stewart and 
Johanson, 1999). 
 
Since Directive 90/220 entered into force in October 1991, 18 
authorizations for the commercial release of GM crops have been approved, 
only two of these are food crops (8 are feed crops).  There have been no 
approvals since October 1998, however.
16  This situation was politically if not 
                                                           
15 A third measure, Directive 90/219/EEC governs the contained use of genetically modified 
micro-organisms.  The European Medicines Evaluation Agency is responsible for evaluating 
all medicines derived from biotechnology. 
16 Two varieties of genetically modified carnation were approved by member state consent in 
October 1998.  The most recent food/feed crops were approved (by the centralized procedure) 
in April 1998.     
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legally formalized in June 1999 when the Danish, French, Greek, Italian and 
Luxembourg governments adopted a declaration suspending new authorizations 
pending the adoption of a revised directive (Council, 1999). 
 
Although the Commission has proposed the authorization of five 
additional crops − two cotton, two rape seed (canola), and one fodder beet − the 
member governments, operating through the Regulatory Committee, have not 
approved their authorization.  In the case of the two cotton crops the Council 
failed to act, but the Commission, in the light of the hostile response to its 
authorization of Ciba-Geigy￿s Bt maize, has not approved the cotton varieties.
17  
With respect to the other three crops, the member governments postponed 
consideration pending additional information from the companies concerning 
how they would respond to new tracability and labeling requirements begin 
developed as part of the revised directive (Agence Europe, 11/3/00).  
 
Further, a number of member governments are refusing to accept GM 
crops that have been authorized.  The Austrian, French, German, Greek and 
Luxembourg governments have invoked the ￿safety clause￿ (Article 16) of 
Directive 90/220 to ban temporarily varieties of GM maize and canola (oilseed 
rape).  The Commission is currently pursuing eight cases against these member 
states. In each case the Commission￿s Scientific Committee on Plants has 
deemed the bans unjustified.  Member governments, however, have been 
reluctant to condemn others￿ measures, leaving the ball in the Commission￿s 
court (Agence Europe, 13/1/98; 16/4/98; 12/9/98).  The Commission, however, 
has thus far not proceeded further.  
 
The Revised Directive (2001/18/EC)
18 
 
Motivated by concern for the implications of the EU￿s slow approval process for 
the competitiveness of the European biotechnology and agriculture industries 
and frustration at the fragmentation of the single market caused by governments￿ 
invoking the ￿safeguard clause,￿ the Commission proposed amending directive 
90/220/EEC in February 1998 (Commission, 2000a).  The new directive places 
greater emphasis on precaution and environmental risk assessment based on 
common principles; limits consents to 10 years (which may be extended upon 
review); and requires tracability, monitoring, and labeling throughout the 
production process.  It also makes more of the importance of the principle of 
free circulation and tightens the conditions under which the ￿safeguard clause￿ 
                                                           
17 Interview with a Commission official, San Domenico, 4 Dec. 2000. 
18 Official Journal, L 106, 17 April 2001.     
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can be invoked.
19  There is also a slight, but potentially important change in the 
decision rules in the event that an EU decision is required.  If the Regulatory 
Committee votes against a Commission proposal by a qualified majority, the 
Commission will re-examine its proposal.   
 
Whether the stricter rules will clear the way for new approvals, however, 
is unclear.  When the Council reached its political agreement on the directive in 
June 1999, the Austrian, Belgian, Dutch, Finnish, German, Spanish and Swedish 
governments attached a declaration stating their intention to take a ￿thoroughly 
precautionary approach￿ in authorizations and noting the possibility for member 
governments to introduce stricter measures in conformity with Article 95 of the 
Treaty of Rome (Council, 1999).  Further, the Austrian, Danish, French, Greek, 
Italian and Luxembourg governments have apparently indicated that, although 
they did not block the new directive, they would like the moratorium to remain 
in effect (New York Times, 15 Feb. 2001). 
 
The Novel Food Regulation (Regulation 258/97) 
 
The authorization procedure for GM foods is broadly similar to that in Directive 
90/220/EEC.  The most significant difference is that the Regulation provides for 
a simplified procedure for foods derived from genetically modified crops but no 
longer containing genetic modification and which are ￿substantively equivalent￿ 
to existing foods with respect to composition, nutritional value, metabolism, 
intended use and the level of undesirable substances.  In such cases, a company 
need only notify the Commission when placing a product on the market and 
provide either scientific justification that the product is substantively equivalent 
or an opinion to that effect from the competent authority of a member state.  
Eleven such products have been notified to the Commission (Commission, 
2000a).  The Italian government, however, considers that some of these products 
are not ￿substantially equivalent.￿  In August 2000 it invoked the ￿safeguard 
clause￿ (Article 12) and suspended trade and use of products derived from four 
varieties of GM maize (SCF, 2000).  In September 2000 the EU￿s Scientific 
Committee on Food issued its opinion that the ban was not justified by the 
evidence provided by the Italian authorities (SCF, 2000). 
 
  Two genetically modified food plants − a variety of soy and a variety of 
maize − were approved under Directive 90/220/EEC prior to the entry into force 
of the Novel Foods Regulation.  To date no products consisting of or containing 
live GM crops have been authorized under the Novel Food Regulation 
(Commission, 2000a), although nine applications are pending.   
                                                           
19 From having ￿justifiable reason￿ to consider a product a risk, the member government must 
have ￿new or additional information￿ affecting the environmental risk assessment or 
reassessment of existing information on the basis of new or additional scientific knowledge.       




Labeling is mandatory for all authorized genetically modified products in which 
DNA or protein resulting from genetic modification is present.
20  This applies to 
seeds, plants and foods.  Commission Regulation 49/2000 requires labeling if 
genetically modified content exceeds 1 percent (￿adventitious￿ or accidental 
presence).  Specific labeling requirements (under Commission Regulation 
50/2000) apply to foods and food ingredients containing additives or flavorings 
derived from genetic modification. 
 
IV.  The Contours of the Dispute 
 
As the preceding discussion illustrates there are significant philosophical and 
institutional differences between how the EU and US approach the approval of 
agricultural biotechnology products.  These are summarized in Table 1.   
Table 1. Summary of US and EU approaches to the regulation of biotechnology 
Aspect US  EU 
Philosophical    
View of biotech  ￿Substantially equivalent￿  Inherently different (de facto)
Approach to risk management  ￿Sound science￿  ￿Precautionary principle￿ 
Consumers￿ right to know  No  Yes 
Institutional/Regulatory    
Decision-making style  Administrative  Political (de facto) 
Pre-release notification  Field tests ￿ mandatory 
Pesticides - mandatory 
Foods ￿ Voluntary if GRAS 
 
Mandatory 
Approval required  Field tests ￿ yes 
Pesticides ￿ yes 
Foods ￿ no if GRAS 
 
Yes 
Labeling  Only in specific instances  Mandatory 
Source: augmented and adapted from McGarity and Hansen, 2001. 
 
Not surprisingly, these differences have produced significantly different 
outcomes in terms of crops approved.  The US authorities has approved the 
commercial growing of 54 varieties of genetically engineered crops and 48 
foods derived from these new plants.  The EU has approved 11 genetically 
engineered crops, only 3 of which (including a variety of tobacco) are for human 
consumption.  Two of the 11 can only be used in breeding activities and three 
are approved only for importation and processing (Commission, 2000a).   
 
                                                           
20 The Novel Foods Regulation requires labeling of all processed foods and food ingredients 
derived from GM crops (among others).  Council Regulation 1139/98 extended that 
requirement to the two GM crops approved before the Novel Food Regulation was adopted.     
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The trade dispute began to simmer during 1997 when US companies 
began to complain about the EU￿s slow and opaque approval process (USTR, 
1998a).  The banning of some EU-approved GM products by some EU member 
governments also prompted concern.  The dispute, however, really intensified 
when the EU adopted its rules on mandatory labeling and burst into flame with 
the announcement of a de facto moratorium on approvals by five member 
governments in June 1999.  
 
Table 2 compares the US and EU approvals for the crops in which 
biotechnology is most used and reports the importance of US exports to the EU. 
Box 1 chronicles the key events in the dispute. 
Table 2. Comparison of approvals 
  US EU 
















with MS bans 
(2000) 





Soybeans 5  50%  15%
 f 1  0 
Cotton 4  55%  clothing  only  0 0 
Canola 2  15%
g oil  only  2  2 
Sources: 
a Wallace Center (2000) 
b James (2000)   
c Commission (2000a) 
d 1995 FAO (data for subsequent years 
incomplete) 
e Interview, former representative of the Corn 
Refiners Association, 8/1/01. 
f 1997 ASA (1998) 
g Commission (2000b) 
 
Although many more varieties of genetically modified corn and soybean 
are approved in the US than in the EU, less than 5 percent of US GM corn 
production is of varieties not yet approved in the EU
21 and virtually all US GM 
soybean production is of the one variety approved in the EU and is kept separate 
from that which is not (ASA, 2000).  
 
Because corn gluten feed, the major corn-derived product exported to the 
EU, has been processed and cannot grow, it is not affected by differences in 
approvals.
22  The processed oil from six varieties of GM oilseed rape have been 
approved in the EU under the notification procedure of the Novel Foods 
Regulation (Commission, 2000a).  Likewise, clothing produced from GM cotton 
is not affected, and the US does not export raw cotton to the EU.
23
                                                           
21 http://www.ncga.com/11biotechnology/know_where/statement.htm  
22 Interview with a former representative of the Corn Refiners Association, Washington, DC, 
8 Jan. 2001. 
23 Interview with a USDA official, Washington, DC, 11 Jan. 2001.     
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Box 1. Key events in the transatlantic biotechnology dispute 
Date EU  US  International 
2/96  First food crop approval     
2/97  Aust. and Lux. ban GM corn     
5/97  Novel Foods Regulation     
2/98      Negotiation of Biosafety 
Protocol starts 
4/98  Insufficient support for action against 
Aust. & Lux. bans 
4 food crops approved 
  
5/98 Commission  proposal     
7/98    Raised EU labeling in WTO 
TBT Committee 
 
9/98  Greece bans 1 GM oilseed rape     
10/98  Last approvals before moratorium     
11/98  France bans 2 GM oilseed rapes     
2/99  Regulatory Committee not approve 2 
GM cottons 
 1
st meeting of TEP 
Biotechnology Group 
Cartagena meeting on 
Biosafety Protocol 
3/99    House hearing on biotech. 
regulation 
Bipartisan warning against 
excessive EPA regulation 
 
4/99      TACD position on GM foods  
Codex meeting on labeling 
5/99   Nature letter on Monarch 
butterfly 
TAED position on GM foods 
6/99  Council common position 
Moratorium 
  
7/99    USDA policy initiative  Montreal meeting on 
Biosafety Protocol 
10/99    Senate hearing on biotech. 
regulation 
Clinton-Prodi agreement  
TABD position on GM foods 
11/99    House bill on mandatory 
labeling 
1st FDA public hearing 
 
12/99      EU-US agree 2-track 
approach 
WTO Ministerial 
1/00  1% threshold set for labeling    Biosafety Protocol agreed 
2/00    Senate bill on mandatory 
labeling 
 
3/00  Reg. Committee postpones decisions 
on 3 GM varieties 
Germany bans GM corn 
House and Senate bills 
calling for mandatory 
FDA approval 
1
st session of the Codex 
biotech task force 
4/00  Austria bans another GM corn  NRC Report   
5/00    White House initiative  EU-US Summit Statement  
8/00  Italy bans foods derived from 4 
varieties of GM corn 
  
9/00    StarLink found in human 
food 
 
12/00      EU-US Biotech. Consultative 
Forum Report 
1/01   FDA  proposals 
EPA final rule (withdrawn) 
 
3/01  Revised directive adopted         
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The impact of any differences in approvals, however, is greatly amplified by 
US￿s commodity-based agricultural system in which crops are gathered together 
from farms and transported in bulk to grain elevators for subsequent distribution.  
The possible presence of non-approved variety of a genetically modified crop, 
therefore, threatens the export potential  
of the entire crop.  Establishing a system that keeps genetically modified and 
non-genetically modified crops separate (￿segregation￿ or ￿identity 
preservation￿) increases costs an estimated 12 percent over the farm price (Lin et 
al, 2000). 
 
The main commodity to have been affected by the differences in EU and 
US approvals, therefore, is corn.  US exports, estimated to be worth $200 
million per year, have essentially stopped because US producers cannot 
guarantee that shipments contain only EU-approved varieties.
24  The impact of 
this impediment, however, is relatively small as US corn exports to the EU were 
very small (less than 5 percent of all corn exports in 1995) even before the 
differences in approvals became a problem.
25 
 
V. The Response in the US 
 
The actual and potential barrier to US agricultural exports presented by the 
differences between EU and US approvals of GM crops has triggered a variety 
of commercial and political responses within the US.  This section describes 
those responses, while the following section analyses why the political 




Adaptation: Give the Europeans what they want 
 
A number of US agricultural producers have sought to mitigate the impact of 
fewer EU approvals.  US corn refiners have established an identity preservation 
system that enables them to reassure their European customers that they make 
every effort to use only EU-approved varieties of corn.
26  The American 
Soybean Association has worked with the biotechnology industry to ensure that 
the one US-approved variety of soybean (High-Oleic) that is not approved in the 
                                                           
24 Interview with a USDA official, Washington, DC, 11 Jan. 2001. 
25 The US has a quota that secures historical US exports to the Iberian peninsula as the result 
of a trade dispute following Portuguese and Spanish accession to the EU in 1986.  In 1995, 
the last year for which FAO statistics are complete Spain accounted for 62 percent of US corn 
exports to the EU; Portugal for 17 percent and Austria for 13 percent. 
26 Interview with a former representative of the Corn Refiners Association, Washington, DC, 
8 Jan. 2001.     
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EU is grown on a small scale and kept separate from the rest of the crop (ASA, 
2000).  The US wheat industry, half of whose production is exported, is 
pursuing a similar line, insisting that Monsanto put in place a system to strictly 
segregate GM wheat from ordinary varieties even before the company has 
secured regulatory approval in the US (US Wheat Associates, 2001).   
 
The National Corn Growers Association (NCGA) has established a 
￿Know before you grow/know where to go￿ program that provides information 
on companies selling only those GM corn hybrids approved for import into the 
EU.
27  Manufacturers of processed foods have sought to eliminate non-EU 
approved GM ingredients by changing the sourcing of certain ingredients, 
transferring production of some product lines (i.e., those involving corn) to the 
EU, and by refraining from introducing new products on the EU market.
 28    
De facto trading up 
More profoundly, some US farmers organizations, particularly those that are 
particularly export dependent, are effectively complying with EU approvals.   
The American Soybean Association, for example, has asked that one variety of 
soybean (LibertyLink) not be grown commercially until it has received 
regulatory approval in major export markets (ASA, 2000). In addition, the area 
of GM corn planted in the US decreased sharply in 2000 (James, 2001).   
Although there are a number of factors at play in this decrease, at least some of 
it is attributed to farmers￿ concern about access to export markets (James, 
2001).
29 The National Corn Growers Association (NCGA, 2001) says that it 
supports the commercial release of GM corn varieties that have been fully 
approved in the US and Japan (its most important export market) and for which 
approval is being ￿aggressively￿ pursued in every other export market.  It 
￿insist(s)￿ on due diligence in bringing products to market in a manner that does 
not disrupt domestic or international trade. 
 
  In addition, number of major US food companies ￿ including, Gerber, 
Heinz, McGain and Frito Lay ￿ have announced that their products will be GM 
free in response to the increased concern of US consumers (Pollack and Shaffer, 
2001). For the same reason US sugar refiners have asked farmers not to grow 
genetically modified sugar beets (Wall Street Journal, 27 April 2001). 
 
  The various commercial responses are summarized in Table 4. 
                                                           
27 http://www.ncga.com/11biotechnology/know_where/statement.htm  
28 Interview with representatives of the National Food Processors Association, Washington, 
DC, 9 Jan. 2001. 
29 Interview with a former representative of the American Corn Growers Association, 
Washington, DC, 11 Jan. 2001.     
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Table 4. Commercial responses to differences in EU and US approvals. 
Commercial response  Industry 
Provide information on EU-approved varieties  Corn growers 
Established identity preservation system  Corn refiners 
Wheat growers 
Soybean growers 
Non-commercialization of non-EU-approved varieties   Soybean growers 
Not accept GM ingredients  Sugar refiners 
Change sourcing of ingredients   Food manufacturers 
 
De jure Trading Up: Incremental Reform 
 
The initial US response to the EU￿s new rules was incomprehension and 
irritation.  Until mid-1999 Congressional testimony by Clinton Administration 
officials and industry representative and statements by Congresspeople of both 
parties repeatedly depicted the EU￿s approval process as at best over politicized 
and at worst protectionist (see, for example, Barshefsky, 1999; Dykes, 1998; 
Eisenstat, 1999, Johnson, 1999; Lugar, 1999, Smith et al, 1998).
30  In addition, 
the US regulatory system was generally up-held as appropriate, and certainly 
adequate.  The 3 March 1999 hearing of the House Committee on Agriculture￿s 
Subcommittee on Risk Management about agricultural biotechnology, which did 
not include testimony from any civic interest groups, did not hear one word of 
criticism of the US regulatory system.
31  Later that month Republican and 
Democratic Representatives cautioned the EPA against tightening its regulation 
of biotechnology on the grounds that it was unnecessary and that it might harm 
the industry.
32  In October 1999 representatives of the EPA (Andersen, 1999), 
FDA (Maryanski, 1999), USDA (McCammon, 1999) and industry (Barach, 
1999; Giddings, 1999; Kushner, 1999) all assured the Senate Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry that the US regulatory approach was 
appropriate. 
 
  During the second half of 1999, however, things began to change.  In July 
1999 US Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman announced a new policy 
initiative on agricultural biotechnology.  In November 1999 the FDA held the 
first of three public meetings on its procedures for approving and labeling 
                                                           
30 See also House of Representatives, Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on Risk 
Management hearing on Agricultural Biotechnology, 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/ag/hag1066.000/hag1066_0.htm. 
31 House of Representatives, Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on Risk Management 
hearing on Agricultural Biotechnology, 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/ag/hag1066.000/hag1066_0.htm. 
32 ￿Republican, Democrat Committee Leaders Urge Caution in New Plant Regulations, 
Request EPA Re-propose Plant-Pesticide Rule,￿ 
http://agriculture.house.gov/106/pr990324a.html.     
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genetically modified foods.  In May 2000 the Clinton Administration announced 
agricultural biotechnology initiatives to ￿strengthen science-based regulation and 
consumer access to information￿ (see Box 2). 
Box 2 May 2000 White House initiatives 
•   an interagency assessment of federal environmental regulations pertaining to agricultural 
biotechnology; 
•   mandatory prior notification to the FDA of agricultural biotechnology crops or products to 
be introduced into the food supply; 
•   public access to information submitted to the FDA and the agency￿s conclusions; 
•   an expanded program of research focusing on current and future safety issues; 
•   the FDA to develop guidelines for voluntary efforts to label food products; 
•   USDA to work with farmers and industry to facilitate the creation of reliable testing 
procedures and quality assurance programs for differentiating non-GM products; 
•   USDA and the State Department to provide farmers with timely information on oversees 
markets; and 
•   USDA, FDA, EPA and the State Department to enhance domestic and foreign public 
education and outreach activities to improve understanding of the US regulatory process. 
Source: White House, 2000. 
The USDA moved first.  On 13 July 1999 then Secretary of Agriculture Dan 
Glickman (1999) acknowledged that biotechnology raises a number of questions 
that have not been adequately addressed.  In particular he warned that if 
consumers do not trust the regulatory process they would not accept agricultural 
biotechnology.  In response he announced a new approach to biotechnology 
based on five principles: arm￿s length regulation, consumer acceptance, fairness 
to farmers, corporate citizenship and free and open trade.  Among the specific 
initiatives that accompanied this policy statement were a review of the USDA￿s 
approval process by the National Academy of Sciences (due in autumn 2001); a 
review to reinforce the separation between the Department￿s regulatory and 
promotion functions; and the establishment of an Advisory Committee on 
Biotechnology to address social and economic implications of agricultural 
biotechnology. 
 
The FDA￿s public meetings during late 1999 and early 2000 produced 
what the Agency heard as three clear messages: 1) that there is no new scientific 
information that raises concern about the safety of foods already on the market; 
2) that some of public is not convinced that the FDA￿s regulatory approach is 
adequate; and 3) that there is divided opinion on whether GM foods should bear 
special labeling (FDA, 2001a).  Although it stands by its policy of assuming that 
genetically modified foods are safe when the proteins and other substance s 
involved do not differ significantly from those commonly occurring in food, the 
FDA acknowledges that breeders utilizing genetic engineering can introduce 
genetic material from a much wider range of sources, which may require the     
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they be regulated as food additives (which would require premarket approval), 
and that the increasing introduction of multiple genes may cause unintended 
effects to become more common (FDA, 2001a).   
 
Consequently, the FDA proposed introducing a system of mandatory 
premarket  notification of foods (and animal feed) derived from GM crops, 
whether produced in the US or imported.  If a product that the FDA is not 
convinced is safe is marketed, the FDA will take legal action, however, the FDA 
says it does not have the legal authority under its current statutes to require pre-
market approval (unless it is classed as a food additive) (Jacobson, 2001). The 
FDA is also proposing to increase the availability of information about 
notifications, but within the limits of commercial confidentiality set by the 
Freedom of Information Act.
33 
  
The FDA (2001b) contends that under its historical interpretation of the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (Section 403) it can require labeling only 
when it contains information that is ￿material￿ with respect to the consequences 
that may result from the use of the food.  The FDA, therefore, does not consider 
that it has the power to require labeling of genetically modified foods beyond 
what is already required, and advanced draft guidelines for only voluntary 
labeling.  In October 2000 the US District Court for the District of Columbia 
accepted the FDA￿s view that special labeling for genetically modified foods as 
a class is not required solely because of consumer demand or because of the 
process used to develop them (FDA, 2000).  Consumer organizations, however, 
contend that the FDA could require mandatory labeling by changing its 
interpretation of the ￿materiality￿ concept in the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act (see, for example, McGarity and Hansen, 2001).   
 
There is also some reason to question the constitutionality of requiring 
labeling of GM foods.
34  A 1996 Second Circuit Court ruling in International 
Dairy Foods v. Amestoy,
35 overturned, on the grounds that it contravened the 
First Amendment, a Vermont law requiring manufacturers to identify products 
that were or might have been derived from dairy cows treated with rBST 
because it required companies to ￿speak￿ when they would rather not.  Some 
(see, for example, McGarity and Hansen, 2001) contend that if labeling 
measures were justified on health and safety grounds rather than just the 
consumers right to know (as was the case in Vermont), the constitutionality 
problem would be defused.   
  
                                                           
33 The FDA￿s view is that most of the data submitted as part of a pre-market biotechnology 
notice (PBN) would not constitute trade secrets and so could be made public. 
34 For a discussion see McGarity and Hansen, 2001. 
35 International Dairy Foods v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d. Cir. 1996).     
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On 17 January 2001 the EPA adopted final rules on plant-incorporated 
protectants (PIPs) (previously ￿plant-pesticides￿).  These rules largely 
formalized the EPA￿s existing process (EPA, 2001), which was laid out in a 
1994 proposed rule.  The EPA is also considering whether to finalize 
exemptions for three categories of PIPs
36 from regulatory oversight, which were 
included in the 1994 proposal.  The elimination of these exemptions was 
advocated by a April 2000 National Research Council report (NRC, 2000).  This 
report, among other things (see below), recommended strengthening the EPA￿s 
regulatory role.
37  The EPA has invited comment on National Research Council 
report.  On 20 January 2001, at the White House￿s request, the proposed rule 




In addition to the changes to administration policy, there have been a number of 
legislative initiatives at the federal (see Table 4) and state levels since late 1999 
(see Table 5).  These initiatives have tended to take a much more skeptical line 
towards biotechnology and a more favorable approach to consumers￿ right to 
know.  Given the predominance of Democratic sponsors of federal legislation 
and Bush Administration￿s generally hostile attitude towards regulation (see, for 
example, New York Times, 23/5/01), it is highly unlikely that the legislative 
initiatives that go beyond what is already in train will have much impact.  There 
may be more movement at the state level where eight states are considering 
requiring mandatory labeling (Maine is to hold a referendum on the issue in 
November 2001).  
                                                           
36 These exceptions are: PIPs derived through genetic engineering from sexually compatible 
plants; PIPs that act primarily by affecting the plant (e.g., thicker wax cuticles); and PIPs 
based on viral coat proteins (substances that encapsulate and protect the genetic material of 
certain plant viruses). 
37 Interview with an EPA official, Washington, DC, 9 Jan. 2001.     
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Table 4 Federal Legislative Initiatives 
Date Bill  Aim  Sponsor(s) 
11/99  HR3377  Mandatory labeling  Kucinich (OH), Metcalf, Bonior (MI), 
Defazio (OR), Smith (NJ), Doyle (PA), 
Lipinski (IL), Brown (OH), Hinchey 
(NY), Schakowsky (IL), Norton (DC), 
Stark (CA), Woolsely (CA), Mink 
(HI), Martinez, McDermott (WA), Lee 
(CA), Waters (CA) 
2/00  S2080  Mandatory labeling  Boxer (CA) 
3/00  HR3883  Treat as food additives  Kucinich (OH), Metcalf, Hinchey 
(NY), Conyers (MI), Sanders (I-VT), 
Woolsely (CA), Lee (CA) 
3/00  S23115  Treat as food additives  Moynihan, Reid (NV), Boxer (CA). 
10/00  S3184  Mandatory FDA pre-market 
approval, more research, 
increased access to information 
Durbin (IL) 
1/01  HR115  Education about and further 
research on agricultural 
biotechnology 
Holt (NJ) 
Notes: Unless otherwise noted sponsors are Democrats. Absence of state denotes not re-




Table 5 Active State legislative initiatives 
Aim State(s) 
Mandatory labeling  CA; CO; MA; ME; MI; NH; PA; VT 
Mandatory environmental assessment  HI; MN, TX (adopted 1/95) 
Moratorium on planting GM  MA, MN; NY, VT; MD (terminator gene) 
Higher standard of legal liability  MA 
Legal liability for contaminating non-GM  MN, NB 
Mandatory labeling of rBST milk products   NY 
Consider ban in school food  OK 
Protection of GM crops  CA, SD 
Source: adapted from Grimm, 2001 and http://www.bio.org/govt/testimony2001.html . 
Note: Unless otherwise stated all legislation are bills. 
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VI. Explaining Observed Change 
 
Although the changes in US policy are modest they are changes, and the 
changes in US politics are substantially more pronounced.  The timing of the 
changes, starting in mid- to late-1999, suggests a link to EU policies, 
particularly the adoption of mandatory labeling in February 1998 and the 
announcement of a de facto moratorium in July 1999.  There appear to be two 
main impacts of EU policies: 1) to heighten the awareness of US civic interest 
organizations to the potential pitfalls of biotechnology and 2) to provide an 
exemplar that is deployed by US civic interest organizations when arguing for 
domestic regulatory change.  These impacts have had knock on effects on US 
consumer attitudes to biotechnology and, consequently, on how some industry 
organizations view stricter regulation. 
 
The Mobilization of Civic Interests 
 
US government (Levitt, 2000b)
38 and European Commission officials,
39 and 
representatives of industry associations
40 and civic interest organizations 
(Tucker Foreman, 1999)
41 attribute the greater mobilization of civic interest 
groups in the US at least in part to the publicity surrounding the EU-US trade 
dispute (see also Pollack and Shaffer, 2001).  The impact seems to have been 
most pronounced on the US consumer organizations.   
 
Prior to the trade dispute with the EU and their engagement in the 
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), which brought together consumer 
organizations from the EU and US, US consumer groups did not campaign on 
agricultural biotechnology, even though they had been very involved on food 
safety issues, including pesticide residues.  In December 1998, for example, a 
representative of Public Citizen addressing the FDA Science Forum on 
Biotechnology explicitly left aside food safety issues to concentrate on the 
regulation of biologics and drugs (Wolfe, 1998).  Although the Consumers 
Union participated in the ￿Global Days of Action against Gene Foods￿ in April 
1997, it did not issue an independent news release on agricultural biotechnology 
until August 1999 in conjunction with the first Consumers Report (September 
1999) article on the subject, while the Consumer￿s Choice Council did not do so 
                                                           
38 Interview with a USDA official (Washington, DC, 12 Jan. 2001). 
39 Interview with a Commission (Washington, DC, 10 Jan. 2001). 
40 Interview with representatives of the European-American Business Council (Washington, 
DC, 8 Jan. 2001) and National Food Processors Association (Washington, DC, 9 Jan. 2001). 
41 Interviews with representatives of the Centre for Food Safety (Washington, DC, 10 Jan. 
2001) and the (UK) Consumers￿ Association (Florence, 2 Apr. 2001).     
RSC 2001/30 ' 2001 Alasdair R. Young  25
until November 1999.
42  The Consumer Federation of America￿s first 
independent statement came at the FDA￿s hearing in November 1999.
43 
 
In fact, the main US consumer organizations first formal contribution to 
the policy debate on agricultural biotechnology was the Transatlantic Consumer 
Dialogue￿s statement adopted in April 1999 (see Box 3).  Apparently, during the 
discussions within the TACD that led to the statement the US consumer 
organizations became sensitized to the concerns of their European 
counterparts.
44 
Box 3 TACD Statement on Genetically Modified Organisms, April 1999 
￿Since consumers are concerned about risks, the environment, socio-economic factors, ethical 
issues and the lack of benefit for consumers, the TACD calls upon the governments of the US 
and the EU to establish effective and mandatory government approval systems of human 
health, safety and environmental protection. 
￿Genetically modified (GM) foods should provide a clear showing of consumer benefits and 
present no harm to human or animal health or the environment. 
￿In order to ensure consumers￿ right to choose and to be informed, governments must require 
mandatory labeling of all genetically engineered foods and ingredients based on complete 
traceability of GMO￿s throughout the entire production, processing and distribution chain.￿ 
Source: TACD, Doc No. Food-5-99 (emphasis added). 
 
Some environmental organizations − such as the Center for Food Safety, Jeremy 
Rifkin￿s Foundation on Economic Trends and the Union of Concerned Scientists 
− had been active on agricultural biotechnology issues for much longer.  Some 
of the more prominent environmental organizations − such as Friends of the 
Earth USA, Greenpeace USA, the Sierra Club and the US Public Interest 
Research Group − however, did not start actively campaigning on the issue until 
1998/1999 (PBS, 2001).
45  Friends of the Earth USA, for example, did not write 
to US corporate executives to ask them to go GM-free until 6 August 1999,
46 
                                                           
42 Based on a search of the Consumer Union￿s 
(http://www.consumerunion.org/news/news.html) and Consumer￿s Choice Council 
(http://www.consumerscouncil.org/ccc/gmo/gmo.htm) websites. 
43 Based on a search of the Consumer Federation of America￿s website 
(http://www.consumerfed.org/releases.html) 
44 Interviews with a Commission official (Washington, DC, 10 Jan. 2001) and representative 
of the (UK) Consumers￿ Association (Florence, 2 Apr. 2001). 
45 Interview with a representatives of the Centre for Food Safety (Washington, DC, 10 Jan. 
2001) corroborated by extensive searches of the organizations￿ web pages.  The earliest 
document on GM food on the Greenpeace website 
(http://www.greenpeaceusa.org/ge/gereleasestext.htm is December 1999; the earliest on 
USPIRG￿s site (http://www.pirg.org/ge/press/ is mid-2000; the earliest document on the 
Sierra Cub￿s website (http://www.sierraclub.org/biotech/) is August 1999; and the earliest 
document on Friends of the Earth￿s website (http://www.foe.org/safefood/) is June 1999. 
46 http://www.foe.org/safefood/companyletter.html.     
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more than 18 months after a its sister organization in the UK had launched a 
similar campaign.  Although Greenpeace participated in the April 1997 ￿Days of 
Action,￿ it did not join a May 1998 lawsuit against the FDA￿s GM food policy, 
although it was a party to a February 1999 lawsuit against EPA approval of Bt 
crops (CFS, 2000).  
 
The EU, however, was not the only, perhaps not even the major, 
motivator for the environmental organizations.  In February 1999 negotiations 
began in earnest on a protocol to the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity to 
establish procedures for the safe transportation, handling and use of living GM 
organisms that might adversely affect biodiversity.  Apparently more important, 
however, was a letter in the May 1999 issue of Nature that reported the findings 
of a laboratory study that suggested pollen from Bt corn could adversely affect 
the caterpillar of the Monarch butterfly. This letter sparked widespread press 
coverage and galvanized the US environmental movement (Pollack and Shaffer, 
2001).  Friends of the Earth, for example, in its letters to President Clinton and 
food industry CEOs urging them to go GM-free focused heavily on the 
implications for the Monarch (FoE, 1999a, 1999b).  Although the publication of 
the Nature letter coincided with the adoption of the Transatlantic Environment 
Dialogue￿s (TAED) position on GM foods, none of the major US environmental 
organizations participated in the working group that produced the statement.
47  
European and other environmental organizations apparently did, however, 
participate in a meeting in October 1999 to plan a campaign against agricultural 
biotechnology in the United States (Wall Street Journal, 12 October 1999). 
 
Whatever the impact of the EU￿s policies in mobilizing US civic interest 
organizations, it is evident that they serve as exemplars in the ensuing policy 
debate.  Although not entirely uncritical of the EU￿s regulatory regime (see, for 
example, McGarity and Hansen, 2001), US civic interest organizations are 
united in their support for two key elements of the EU regime that are lacking in 
the US: mandatory approval and mandatory labeling of all GM foods.
48  
Consequently, they regularly cite what the EU is doing in support of their 
desired policy changes (see, for example, McGarity and Hansen, 2001; Hansen, 
2000; FoE, nd; Consumer Reports, September 1999). 
 
                                                           
47 http://tiesweb.org/taed/wg/agriculture/concerns_gmo.html 
48 It should be noted that although US civic interest organizations share these reform aims 
they have different overarching objectives.  The consumer organizations for the most part 
acknowledge potential benefits from biotechnology but want to ensure that is safe and 
advocate the consumer￿s right to know as a point of principle (Silberberg, 1999; Tucker 
Foreman, 1999).  The environmental organizations tend to be much more hostile to the 
technology and see labeling as a means of killing the technology through market means 
(implication of interview of a representative of the Center for Food Safety, Washington, DC, 
10 Jan. 2001).     
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It is important to note, however, that while US consumer and 
environmental organizations advocate similar policy reforms, their aims are not 
identical.  The environmental organizations tend to be much more hostile toward 
the new technology; seeing stricter standards and heightened consumer 
awareness as means of stifling it.  The consumer organizations, by contrast, tend 
to perceive potential benefits from the technology, but demand safety and the 
right to choose. 
 
Changing Consumer Preferences 
 
Following the mobilization of US civic interest organizations there appears to 
have been a marked decline in public support for biotechnology in the US (see 
Figure 1). This decline was sharpest during mid-1999 when the campaign was 
just beginning.  The discovery in September 2000 that a variety of GM corn 
(StarLink) that had been approved for use only in animal feed had found its way 
into the human food chain appears to have had less impact on attitudes toward 
biotechnology, but a greater impact on consumers￿ desire for mandatory 
labeling.  
 
Although American consumers￿ concern about genetically modified food 
appears to have increased since the trade dispute with the EU really started to 
simmer (see also NSF, 2000), they still tend to be less worried about the 
technology than their European counterparts (NSF, 2000 and see Table 6).  In 
addition, some of the more sophisticated studies of US consumer attitudes reveal 
that they are at least if not more concerned about the use of pesticides than they 
are about genetic modification (CSPI, 2001; PIFB, 2001).  Although many 
surveys (CSPI, 2001; PIFB, 2001) show large majorities (greater than 60 
percent) of Americans favor labeling, some indicate that whether a product 
contains genetically modified ingredients is not their chief concern or they only 
favor labeling if it does not cost too much (PIFB, 2001).  There are also real 
doubts about how much US (and European) consumers understand about genetic 
engineering, which makes their opinions malleable when presented with 
additional information (NSF, 2000; PIFB, 2001).  For example, after US 
consumers were informed that genetically modified foods are already widely 
available, 19 percent of consumers who had initially indicated that GM foods 
are unsafe changed their answers to ￿safe,￿ as did 37 percent of those who 
originally said they did not know (PIFB, 2001).  In part this appears to reflect a 
high degree of public confidence in the key US regulatory agencies (Jenkins-
Smith, cited in PBS, 2001).     
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Figure 1. US consumer attitudes to biotechnology
49 
Notes:  
￿beneficial￿ answered positively when asked if biotechnology (including in pharmaceuticals) will provide 
benefits to you or your family within the next five years; 
￿labeling￿ denotes support for mandatory labeling 
Source: International Food Information Council (http://www.ific.org) . 
 
Table 6 Consumer understanding of agricultural biotechnology 
 Percentage  agreeing 
 US  EU 
Eating genetically modified fruit can 
cause your genes to be modified 
14 24 
Ordinary tomatoes do not contain genes, 
only genetically modified ones do 
14 35 
Sources: Horning Priest, 2000 (US); Eurobarometer, 2000 (EU) 
 
Changing Producer Views 
 
Despite the relatively modest (at least compared to Europe) opposition of US 
consumers to genetically modified foods, US agricultural producers at least are 
not taking any chances.  In addition to the sugar refiners who are telling farmers 
not to grow GM sugar beets (Kilman, 2001), others are seeking policy changes.  
The Illinois Farm Bureau, for example, in December 2000 called for legislation 
requiring that GM crops must be approved for all uses (a reference to StarLink) 
and in all export markets before being sold (IFB, 2001).  The American Soybean 
Association (ASA), while expressing confidence in the existing regulatory 
                                                           
49 This data should be treated with caution as fewer people reported having heard about 
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framework, would endorse requiring mandatory FDA approval of products if 
that would reassure consumers (ASA, 1999). 
 
Others favored only modest reforms, and even then only since October 
1999.  The American Farm Bureau (AFB),
50 the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization (BIO)
 51 and the Grocery Manufacturers of America (GMA)
 52 
supported mandatory pre-market notification to the FDA and only voluntary 
labeling.  This is the modest reform that has been adopted so far.  The National 
Corn Growers Association also favors voluntary labeling guidelines, but also 
urges biotech providers to avoid using antibiotic markers because they 
￿unnecessarily raise consumer concerns￿ (NCGA, 2001).  
 
More than a Response to Just the EU 
 
Although the EU￿s policy seems to have acted as a catalyst to the policy debate 
in the US, it has not been the sole driver.  As mentioned earlier, several 
environmental organizations had opposed agricultural biotechnology from the 
outset.  It would also appear that concern surrounding the impact of Bt corn on 
the Monarch butterfly was crucial to galvanizing other US environmental 
organizations (PBS, 2001). 
 
  In addition, the regulatory process has not been static and has been subject 
to periodic review and assessment.  In September 1998, for example, the FDA 
issued a draft guidance asking developers of biotechnology to think carefully 
about using antibiotic resistance markers
53 and stating that some markers should 
not be used (FDA, 1998).  The development of the technology is also 
influencing the regulatory process.  The FDA (2001) justified its heightened 
oversight of agricultural biotechnology on changes in techniques (increasing 
introduction of multiple genes and more traits intended to modify the food itself) 
and because foreign producers might not voluntarily consult with the FDA as 
US-based producers are believed to do. 
 
In March 1999 the National Research Council (2000: xii) ￿ in response to 
concerns voice by professional societies, members of Congress and others ￿ 
initiated a study of the ￿risks and benefits of genetically modified pest-protected 
plants and the coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology 
affecting the use of these plants.￿ Although generally supportive of the US 
regulatory regime, it found room for improvement.  Its recommendations 
included eliminating categorical exceptions from the EPA￿s final rule; finalizing 
                                                           
50 Compare Whisenhunt, (1999) and AFB (2000) 
51 Interview with a BIO representative, Washington, DC, 9 Jan. 2001. 
52 Compare Kushner (1999) and GMA (2001). 
53 Antibiotic resistance genes are used to mark select transform plant cells.     
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an FDA guidance on the assessment of potential food allergens; expanding the 
quantity, quality and public accessibility of information; clarifying the scope of 
USDA￿s coverage so as to capture all GM pest-protected plants; and improving 
coordination among the three agencies. 
 
In addition, as alluded to above, the StarLink episode also heightened 
consumer awareness of the presence of GM foods and concern about the 
regulatory framework.  It, however, seems to have provided as an additional 
push to an already moving process. 
  
In addition to additional internal dynamics, the EU is not the only export 
market whose rules have an impact on US producers (see Table 7).  Japan, as the 
US￿s largest agricultural export market, including for corn, is particularly 
significant.  Although Japan requires pre-market approval of GM products it has 
approved many more than the EU and its mandatory labeling requirements kick 
in only above the 5 percent threshold, which is much easier to meet than the 
EU￿s 1 percent.  In addition, the concern started in the EU and spread to other 
countries.  In many respects, it is this ￿contagion￿ that concerns and angers US 
producers most about the EU￿s policy.
54 
Table 7 Mandatory labeling requirements around the world 
Country  Status of rule 
Australia Pending  implementation 
Brazil  In force (12/00) 
Czech Republic  In force (1/01) 
Chile  In force (5/01) 
Indonesia  In force (1/01) 
Japan  In force (4/01) 
Korea  In force (commodities 3/01; packaged food 7/01) 
Mexico  Legislation being debated 
New Zealand  Pending implementation 
Taiwan Legislation  proposed 
Turkey  In force (1/01) 
Saudi Arabia  In force (1/01) 
Source: NFPA Journal, December 2000 
 
Further, the EU￿s policy has the potential to chill more directly the adoption of 
agricultural biotechnology in other, particularly developing, countries.  Other 
countries that grow GM varieties of crops will face the same problem exporting 
to the EU that the US does and may be even less able to segregate and test their 
                                                           
54 Interviews with representatives of the National Food Processors Association (Washington, 
DC 9 Jan. 2001) and US Grain Council (Washington, DC 11 Jan. 2001).     
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exports to the standard demanded by the EU.
55  Consequently, countries that 
export heavily to the EU may be reluctant to grow any non-EU-approved GM 
crops. 
 
Constraints on Alternatives 
 
Part of the explanation for the change in US domestic policy is tied to the limits 
on other policy alternatives.  The incentive for US producers to contemplate 
domestic policy reforms would be even lower if there were a strong prospect of 
forcing their trading partners to change their rules so as to eliminate the trade 
barriers.  There are a number of reasons why this many not be a viable 
proposition with respect to the EU￿s rules. 
 
First, although the multilateral trading system is essentially designed to 
remove national rules that unnecessarily restrict trade, it also imposes limits on 
those seeking action.  Prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round the United 
States government periodically unilaterally imposed trade sanctions on countries 
in an attempt to get them to change their policies (see, Woolcock, 1991).  The 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the introduction of 
binding dispute settlement, however, have introduced curbs on such unilateral 
action.
56  This constraint was underlined by the EU￿s successful case against the 
US concerning Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, which resulted in the 
US undertaking to act in compliance with its WTO obligations.  In other words, 
rather than acting unilaterally, the US government would take its trade 
grievances to the WTO. 
  
Consequently, it is up to the WTO￿s dispute settlement body to determine 
whether a member￿s policies contravene WTO rules.  Only if a government is 
found to be in violation of WTO rules and fails to comply with the ruling, can 
the plaintiff government impose sanctions.  Crucially, the WTO does not 
unequivocally favor free trade. Rather it sets limits on the exceptions to free 
trade.
57  Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(incorporated into the WTO) recognizes the protection of human health and 
safety as legitimate objectives for government action so long as the measures in 
question are not a means of arbitrary discrimination between countries or 
disguised restrictions on trade.  The WTO￿s Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement ￿ which covers, inter alia, labeling ￿ and the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement ￿ which applies to the approval process of GM 
                                                           
55 The impact of EU food safety standards on developing country exports concerns the World 
Bank (see, for example, Otsuki, et al, 2001). 
56  Comment by Ellen Frost at the ￿The New Transatlantic Agenda at Five:  A Critical 
Assessment￿ workshop, European University Institute, 20 Apr. 2001. 
57 I am grateful to Peter Holmes for putting this insight so succinctly.     
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foods ￿ also recognize protecting consumers and the environment as a legitimate 
reasons for a government to adopt trade-impeding regulations, although 
subjecting them to procedural disciplines.
58  The SPS Agreement requires that 
measures be based on an ￿appropriate￿ assessment of the ￿risks to human, animal 
or plant life or health￿ and ￿taking into account risk assessment techniques 
developed by the relevant international organizations.￿  The TBT Agreement, 
meanwhile, only incorporates a voluntary ￿Code of Good Practice for the 
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards.￿  Thus multilateral rules 
allow governments a fair degree of leeway in pursuing their policy objectives, 
particularly with respect to the level of risk that they are willing to accept (PIU, 
2000). Consequently, it is not clear that the US would win a case before the 
WTO. 
 
Several other factors further call into question the likelihood of a 
successful prosecution.  First, the EU has not yet actually rejected any GM 
products, it has just not approved them.  It is consequently harder to argue that 
the EU is taking arbitrary decisions, although there is an issue of timeliness.
59  
Second, the EU￿s rules are non-discriminatory in letter and in practice;
60 more 
EU than US firms have products held up in the regulatory process (Commission, 
2000a).  Third, the EU￿s deliberate release directive, the focus of most concern, 
was being revised for much of the period of the dispute (May 1998 ￿ March 
2001), which meant that it was a moving target and might be irrelevant by the 
time a judgement was issued.  Fourth, due to adjustment by US producers, the 
only product currently affected is corn, worth about $200 million per year and 
accounting less than 1 percent US production.  Further, strictly speaking, the EU 
does not prohibit corn imports from the US, but US producers are reluctant to 
export because of the difficulties of ensuring that no un-approved GM corn is in 
the shipment.
61  These factors are important because to bring a case the US 
government would want to be confident of winning and therefore would want a 
clear cut and important case.
62 
 
In addition, even if the US were to win the case it is unclear whether the 
EU￿s policy would change.
63  To start, with any change would be a long time 
coming.  It is common for WTO cases to take two years from the time a request 
for a panel is filed to the adoption of the Appellate Body￿s report.  A losing 
                                                           
58 For a fuller discussion, see PIU (2000). 
59 Interview with a representative of the European-American Business Council, Washington, 
DC, 8 Jan. 2001. 
60 Interview with a Commission official, San Domenico di Fiesole, 4 Dec. 2000. 
61 Interview with a Commission official, Washington, DC, 10 Jan. 2001. 
62 Interview with a USDA official, Washington, DC, 11 Jan. 2001. 
63 Interviews with representatives of the European-American Business Council (Washington, 
DC, 8 Jan. 2001), the National Food Processors Association (Washington, DC, 9 Jan. 2001); 
and the US Grains Council (Washington, DC, 11 Jan. 2001).     
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defendant then has a ￿reasonable￿ period in which to bring its rules into 
compliance.  The EU, in particular, has been slow change its rules in response to 
WTO judgements.  For example, five years after the WTO Appellate Body 
found against the EU￿s ban on hormone-treated beef the EU still has not 
changed it rules.  Given the depth of consumer opposition in Europe 
governments would be unlikely to act quickly on an issue even more sensitive 
and wide-ranging than the hormone-treated beef ban.  In addition, for much of 
the period of the dispute the French, German and Italian (until June 2001) 
governments had Green Party coalition partners, which makes such policy 
changes even less likely. 
 
Even if the EU were to change its rules, it is far from clear that it would 
improve the situation on the ground.  A number of major European food retailers 
have moved to meet and shape the demand for non-GM food (Commission, 
2000b). For example, a consortium of seven European supermarkets − Carrefour 
(France), Delhaize (Belgium), Esselunga (Italy), Marks and Spencer (UK), 
Migros (Switzerland), Sainsbury (UK) and Superquinn (Ireland) − are 
organizing their supply chains in order to eliminate GM ingredients from their 
own-label products.  Other supermarkets − including Pryca (Spain), Spar 
(Germany), Iceland (UK) and Tesco (UK) − have undertaken individual actions 
to eliminate GM ingredients from their own-brand products.   
  
In such circumstances, some US producers are concerned that an 
aggressive approach might be counter productive, both economically and 
politically.  European consumers would probably not react well to US 
multinationals forcing them to eat food they consider unsafe and therefore might 
vigorously resist the next generation of GM foods, which is expected to bring 
direct benefits to consumers, such as enhanced nutrition.
64  In addition, too 
aggressive a stance might have interfered with the reform process underway in 
the EU, which held out the possibility of resolving much of the dispute.
65  Thus 
for a host of reasons, none of the US agricultural industry associations have (yet 
at any rate) aggressively pushed the US government to pursue a formal dispute 
through the WTO,
66 although some
67 do not see how things could get worse. 
 
                                                           
64 Interviews with representatives of the European-American Business Council (Washington, 
DC, 8 Jan. 2001) and the US Grains Council (Washington, DC, 11 Jan. 2001). 
65 Interview with a former representative of the Corn Refiners Association, Washington, DC, 
8 Jan. 2001. 
66 Interviews with a former representative of the Corn Refiners Association (Washington, DC, 
8 Jan. 2001) and representatives of US Grains Council (Washington, DC, 11 Jan. 2001) 
67 Interview with a representative of the Biotechnology Industry Organization, Washington, 
DC, 9 Jan. 2001.     
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There are some additional, broader considerations that also influence 
government policy.  First, a number of politically influential firms with 
extensive operations on both sides of the Atlantic dislike trade disputes between 
the EU and US because even when they are not directly affected they suffer 
from the poisoned atmosphere.
68  Second, there is a strong disincentive to 
unsettle unnecessarily relations with an important political ally and economic 
partner (Shaffer, 2001).  Third, a finding by the WTO￿s dispute settlement body 
sets precedents, and government officials have to be alert to the implications of 
an apparently favorable ruling for domestic regulators (Shaffer, 2001).
69  A 
successful case that establishes a precedent that undesirably constrains domestic 
policy might be considered a pyretic victory.  Lastly, there is a desire not to 
further strain the WTO dispute settlement mechanism by giving it another 
politically charged case that whether the US wins or loses might further 
undermine the already challenged legitimacy of the multilateral trading system 
(Holmes and Young, 2001). 
 
 
VII. Cooperation: Middle Path or Road to Nowhere? 
 
This discussion suggests that unilateral action by the US ￿ ￿trading up￿ or 
￿trading blows￿ ￿ is unlikely to overcome the trade barriers posed by the EU￿s 
rules. ￿Trading up￿ in the US may be reaching its limits, and thus far adjustments 
to the US approval process have only nudged it towards the EU system.   
Although the new administration might be inclined to take a more aggressive 
stance than its predecessor with the EU over GM foods, there are a number of 
reasons to think that the US government will not pursue a complaint before the 
WTO.  Even if it does, several years would elapse before a judgement is issued, 
and even that would be unlikely to result in a swift (if any) change in EU policy. 
 
The EU￿s new directive may help, but even if it leads to a renewal of 
approvals, the approval process will almost certainly be much slower than in the 
US resulting in a persistent disjuncture between products approved in the two 
markets.  If there is no resumption of approvals, the dispute could well escalate 
as US producers, particularly the biotechnology companies, lose patience.  In 
addition, EU labeling requirements are unlikely to ease.  
  
                                                           
68 Comment by Sir John Browne, European University Institute, 10 November 2000.  See also 
the ￿EU Committee Position Paper on the Implications of Agro-Food Developments on 
International Trade and Transatlantic Relations,￿ 
http://www.eucommittee.be/pop/pop1997/Agf/agf4.htm, 1 December 1997.  One of the 
TABD￿s priority issues for 2001 is ￿Dispute Management￿, which includes resolving existing 
disputes and avoiding new ones (TABD Newsletter, February/March, 2001). 
69 Interview with a USDA official, Washington, DC 11 Jan. 2001.     
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Consequently, there is likely to be a protracted period of trade tension.  
Given that there are limits on what the US government can achieve unilaterally, 
there are incentives for it to seek a negotiated solution.  Significantly, as most of 
the apparent economic cost of the conflict fall on the US, the US government is 
more likely to compromise than is the EU; its ￿cost of no agreement￿ is higher 
(Keohane and Nye, 1989; Milner, 1997; Moravcsik, 1998; Young and Wallace, 
2000).   
  
The extent of the differences between the EU and US, however, may be 
such that no compromise acceptable to both sides is possible.  In particular, the 
persistent underlying differences of approach (as manifested by the lack of 
mandatory prior approval for food products in the US) makes conclusion of a 
true mutual recognition agreement (ASA, 1999; NCGA, 1999/3; US Grains 
Council, 2000) or creation of a centralized approval process,
70 both of which 
have been proposed by firms as ways of overcoming the approval disjuncture, 
unthinkable.
71  The adoption of mandatory labeling, along with the attendant 
segregation and identity preservation, in the US along the lines required in the 
EU would go along way to facilitating trade.  The costs entailed, however, are 
significant and given the Republican Party￿s and especially Bush 
Administration￿s ideological hostility to social regulation adoption of the 
necessary legislation seems improbable. 
  
Therefore, cooperation has focused on reducing friction where possible 
and increasing understanding.  Such bilateral cooperation and exchanges in 
other international fora (see below) has contributed significantly to taking the 
heat out of the conflict by helping the US protagonists to understand that the 
EU￿s policy is not just disguised protectionism, as many at first thought.  Most 
now view the EU￿s policy as a (rather cowardly) political response to real (if 
unfounded) public concern about the safety and environmental consequences of 
GM foods.
72   
 
The most concrete cooperation has taken place within the Transatlantic 
Economic Program￿s Biotechnology Working Group, which was set up in 
February 1999.  It has worked on developing GM testing protocols and 
procedures for corn exports to the EU and has initiated a pilot project on 
                                                           
70 See the TABD￿s October 1999 ￿Berlin Recommendations￿, reproduced in the mid-year 
report 2000 (http://www.tabd.com/about/mym2000.html). 
71 Witness the difficulties the EU and US have had in concluding agreements on the mutual 
recognition of certifications (see Egan, 2001). 
72 Interviews with representatives of the EPA (Washington, DC, 9 Jan. 2001); the European-
American Business Council (Washington, DC, 8 Jan. 2001); National Food Processors 
Association (Washington, DC, 9 Jan. 2001); USDA (Washington, DC, 11 Jan. 2001); US 
Grains Council (Washington, DC, 11 Jan. 2001).     
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simultaneous filings for approval in the EU and US, which focuses on 
harmonizing data requirements.
73  There have also been more political 
discussion within the US-EU Senior Level Group since early 2000 although they 
have not led to substantive outcomes.  An EU-US Biotechnology Consultative 
Forum of independent experts was set up by US President Clinton and 
Commission President Prodi in May 2000.  Its report in December 2000 largely 
supported the EU￿s cautious approach to regulating biotechnology, but also 
stressed the potential of the technology, particularly for developing countries.
74  
There has been no evident policy response to the report. 
  
Discussions are also under way in broader international fora, most notably 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD).  The Codex Ad Hoc Intergovernmental 
Task Force on Food Derived from Biotechnology met for the first time in March 
2000 and again in March 2001.  The taskforce is pursuing two tracks, both 
limited to food safety considerations: Proposed Draft Principles for the Risk 
Analysis of Foods Derived from Modern Biotechnology and Proposed Draft 
Guidelines for the Conduct of Food Safety Assessment of Foods Derived from 
Recombinant DNA Plants.  Progress on both texts has apparently been good, 
although a number of important issues are outstanding (FSIS, 2001).  The risk 
management portion of the Principles Document ￿ particularly whether 
requiring tracability is an appropriate risk management tool and what other 
factors can legitimately be taken into consideration when deciding approvals ￿ 
appears to have been the principle focus of disagreement.  It is clear, however, 
that even if they are agreed and adopted, the Codex principles and guidelines 
will still leave governments with a significant degree of latitude.
75   
 
While Codex is a relative new comer to the issue, regulators have been 
discussing agricultural biotechnology within the OECD for much longer.  The 
OECD￿s Task Force for the Safety of Novel Foods and Feeds began working on 
the issue in late 1990 and its Working Group on Harmonization of regulatory 
Oversight in Biotechnology, which focuses on environmental aspects of 
regulation, was established in 1995 building on work dating back to the mid-
1980s (OECD, 2000a, 2000b).  Both groups have made some progress in 
defining some basic parameters for safety assessment.  In 1993 the Task Force 
established that an assessment of ￿substantial equivalence￿ is the most ￿practical 
approach￿ to determining the relative safety of a new food (OECD, 2000a: 6).  
                                                           
73 ￿Report of the Transatlantic Economic Partnership Steering Group￿ 
http://www.useu.be/SUMMIT/tep1200.html, 18 December 2000. 
74 ￿The EU-US Biotechnology Consultative Forum Final Report,￿ 
http://www.useu.be/ISSUES/biotreport2000.htm, 19 December 
75 It has been agreed, for example, that the purpose of the principles document is to provide a 
framework for risk analysis rather than to give specific advice (FSIS, 2001).     
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The Working Group has sought, with a fair degree of success, to harmonize the 
information and methods used in risk/safety assessments (OECD, 2000b).   
Despite this progress, however, differences in regulatory outcomes persist 
because governments differ in how they manage risk and take other factors 
(such as ethical and socio-economic concerns) into account (OECD, 2000a, 
2000b).  Confronted with these more intractable differences, both OECD groups 
advocate information exchanges and increased transparency. 
 
These multilateral efforts rather than promoting true regulatory 
approximation appear to be setting limits on differentiation.  Consequently, 
while perhaps establishing boundaries for the transatlantic dispute, they are 
unlikely to resolve it.   
 
In the end, time and continued technological development may ease the 
problem.  The longer GM foods are around without causing environmental or 
health problems, the more consumer fears will fade.  In addition, as the next 
generations of agricultural biotechnology products, which deliver concrete and 
direct benefits to consumers,
76 become available, consumers may become more 
willing to consume them and companies will become more willing to label them 
as part of their marketing campaigns.  This, of course, assumes that no harmful 
effects of GM food are found.  If they are, then the trade dispute may be 
resolved through abandonment of the technology.  As one representative of a US 
agricultural trade association said, if a problem is discovered with biotechnology 





Implications for the Dispute 
 
This analysis suggests that the transatlantic dispute over genetically modified 
will simmer for some time to come.  If the EU￿s new directive results in a 
resumption of approvals, however, it also seems unlikely that the dispute will 
burst into flame.  While there has been policy reform in the US, sparked in part 
by the EU￿s policy, there are still profound differences in regulatory approach 
and policy substance between the EU and US.  Because the EU insists on 
approving all GM varieties itself, ￿trading up￿ by the US was never going to be 
sufficient to end the dispute, however, the extent of the persistent differences is 
such that there is still no foundation on which a cooperative arrangement ￿ such 
as a mutual recognition agreement ￿ could be built.  Although a solution is not 
imminent neither is an all-out trade war, as a number of factors ￿ not least that 
                                                           
76 Such products could include crop varieties delivering better flavor or with improved levels 
of specific nutrients. 
77 Interview, Washington, DC, 11 Jan. 2001.     
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the case might not be winnable before the WTO ￿ mitigate against the US 
pursuing an aggressive strategy.  
 
  While there is some scope for cooperation, the focus is more on managing 
friction than on resolving the dispute.  Perhaps the most significant benefit from 
cooperation ￿ increased understanding ￿ has already been reaped.  Further 
benefits could come from agreeing procedures and protocols for testing for GM 
and for managing identity preservation systems.  An agreement covering mutual 
recognition of such tests would greatly amplify the benefits of such an 
agreement. 
 
In these circumstances, the most significant steps toward easing the 
dispute have been market-driven adjustments by US producers (de facto trading 
up).  By accepting only GM varieties approved in the EU (and other markets) a 
number of US producers have lessened the commercial implications of the 
policy discord for them.  This adjustment, however, has exacerbated the 
commercial implications of the dispute for the agricultural biotechnology 





Although the US reforms have been limited, the preceding analysis stresses that 
￿trading up￿ occurs even when international institutions do not favor it and that it 
is a phenomenon that affects actors even as economically and politically 
powerful as the United States.  There are two key aspects to this conclusion.  
The first is the importance of the transmission of political mobilisation as a 
mechanism for ￿trading up.￿  By raising the awareness of US consumers and 
consumer and environmental organisations, the EU￿s rules on GM food 
provided a catalyst to political mobilization and limited policy change.  An 
important caveat, is that domestic institutions play a pivotal role in shaping how 
political mobilisation translates into policy change.  In this instance, the 
prevailing approach to regulation and the legal framework in which it is situated 
dampened the impact of political mobilisation.  The second aspect, is the 
importance of exceptions to multilateral trade rules to diffusing ￿trading blows.￿  
The acceptance in multilateral rules of legitimate obstacles to trade undermines 
aggressive trade policies and creates incentives for cooperative solutions. 
 
There are, however, some trade disputes that are largely intractable, at 
least without exogenous change.  This situation is likely to occur where there are 
profound differences of approach between the protagonists and where 
multilateral trade rules permit governments to exercise discretion; neither 
￿trading up￿ nor ￿trading blows￿ is likely or adequate.  These circumstances     
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appear to arise most frequently when it comes to regulating under scientific 
uncertainty.  As many of these issues touch on safety, particularly food safety, 
they tend to be highly politically sensitive, and therefore harder to resolve. We 
may therefore have to accept a perpetual level of (background) trade friction. 
 
Alasdair R. Young      
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